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1647 
THE GLOBAL COLONY: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASED 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGIMES IN THE 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“National security” is an ambiguous term.1 This ambiguity is 
purposeful
2
 as the time when warfare only consisted of guns and bullets 
has passed. Most anything can be turned into a weapon and the harm it 
may cause is not necessarily corporeal. Especially now, with the 
integration of local economies into the global market, nations are 
beginning to realize the most destructive weapon may be money.
3
 
Countries throughout the world face a pecuniary paradox as they want to 
not only reap the benefits of international trade but also protect themselves 
against economic hegemony.  
The American solution to this puzzle of balancing investment with 
security was illustrated by the acquisition of Smithfield Foods 
 
 
 1. Despite being a widely touted phrase in the post-9/11 era, there is only one definition to 
“national security” codified in law, which comes from an Executive Order by President Obama 
modifying a section of the U.S. Code devoted to the procedures involving access to classified 
information. Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 6.1(cc), 3 C.F.R. 324 (2009), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 3161 
(Supp. I 2013–2014) (statute formerly classified to 50 U.S.C. § 435). This Order defined “national 
security” as “the national defense or foreign relations of the United States.” Id. The focus of this note, 
the Exon–Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, does not define 
“national security” explicitly, although it does imply national security involves “products, services, 
and technologies that are important to U.S. national defense requirements.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 
(2012), as amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 
§ 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425–26. The Exon-Florio Amendment was added to that Act under the 
heading “Authority to Review Certain Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers.” Id. Together they 
modified the Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061–2170. See Paul I. Djurisic, Comment, The 
Exon-Florio Amendment: National Security Legislation Hampered by Political and Economic Forces, 
3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 179, 199 (1991) (stating Treasury Department officials did not “define national 
security because the concept was too difficult to determine clearly.”); see also 2 L. INTL TRADE § 47:3 
(1988). 
 2. Calls to define “national security,” at least under the Exon-Florio Amendment, were rejected 
by the Department of the Treasury’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. 
Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 56 Fed. Reg. 
58,774, 58,775 (Nov. 21, 1991) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800). The reason for leaving this term 
ambiguous is that an explicit definition “could improperly curtail the President’s broad authority to 
protect the national security, and, at the same time, not result in guidance sufficiently detailed to be 
helpful to parties.” Id. at 58,775. 
 3. For instance, Russia has accused the United States of mounting a campaign of economic 
warfare to “subjugate the country.” Ilya Arkhipov & Henry Meyer, Russia Says U.S. Waging Economic 
Warfare to Subjugate Opponents, BLOOMBERG.COM (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2014-11-17/russia-says-u-s-waging-economic-warfare-to-subjugate-opponents. 
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(“Smithfield”)4 by Shuanghui International Holdings Ltd. (“Shuanghui”) 
in 2013.
5
 At $4.7 billion, this acquisition was the largest investment a 
Chinese company had made in the United States at the time.
6
 While the 
size of the transaction alone was enough to court controversy from 
antitrust regulators, there were a variety of other concerns about the 
acquisition.
7
 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(“CFIUS”) reviewed the transaction as most of these concerns involved 
national security.
8
 
CFIUS is an interagency committee meant to review and approve 
mergers and acquisitions of companies that have a relation, however 
tangential, to national security.
9
 Most reviewed transactions involve 
companies that sell products and services related to the military, 
 
 
 4. Smithfield is the world’s largest producer of pork goods as well as the largest producer of 
hogs through its subsidiary Murphy-Brown, LLC. SMITHFIELD, 2012 INTEGRATED REPORT 40, 44 
(2012), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/SFD/2743828229 x0x590240/F33D665C-
409C-4825-A50E-D7F90C10F399/smi_integrated_12.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9FM7-MJH7. 
In 2012, Smithfield had $13.1 billion in revenue. Id. at iii. Brands owned by Smithfield include: 
Smithfield, Eckrich, Farmland Foods, Armour, Cook’s, Gwaltney, John Morrell, Krestchmar, Curly’s, 
Carando, Margherita, and Healthy Ones. Id. at 40–43. 
 5. Amrutha Gayathri, Smithfield Foods Shareholders Approve $4.7 Billion Acquisition by 
China’s Shuanghui, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2013, 2:01 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/smithfield-
foods-shareholders-approve-47-billion-acquisition-chinas-shuanghui-1410564, archived at http://perma. 
cc/HAB2-QTPT. Shuanghui, renamed “WH Group” in January 2014, is a Chinese holding company 
based in Hong Kong. Corporate Profile, WH GROUP, http://www.wh-group.com/en/about/profile.php, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4TFQ-ER7H (last visited Feb. 24, 2015). It is a majority shareholder in 
Henan Shuanghui Development, China’s largest meat producer. Id. Shuanghui’s revenue in 2012 was 
$6.2 billion. Gayathri, supra. 
 6. William Mauldin, U.S. Security Panel Approves Smithfield Takeover, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 
2013, available at http://www.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324577304579058770192856300, 
archived at http://perma.cc/R3PC-LVAE. The five largest acquisitions of American companies by 
Chinese companies, in descending order, are: Smithfield by Shuanghui in 2013 for $4.7 billion, 
International Lease Finance by Investor Group in 2012 for $4.2 billion, AMC Entertainment by Dalian 
Wanda in 2012 for $2.6 billion, IBM’s personal computing division by Lenovo in 2004 for $1.8 
billion, and InterGen by China Huaneng in 2010 for $1.2 billion. Michael J. de la Merced & David 
Barboza, Needing Pork, China Is to Buy a U.S. Supplier, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2013, at A1, 
available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/smithfield-to-be-sold-to-shuanghui-group-of-
china/, archived at http://perma.cc/5XFS-WWKK. 
 7. These concerns focused on the transfer of intellectual property to China as well as concerns 
over the supply of heparin, an anticoagulant produced from pigs. Gayathri, supra note 5. Food safety 
was another concern as China has had several incidents in the past involving the sale of food products 
of questionable integrity. De la Merced & Barboza, supra note 6. Shuanghui was involved in one of 
these incidents when an investigation discovered it was using clenbuterol, an additive banned in 
several countries due to health risks. Id. 
 8. Mauldin, supra note 6. 
 9. See Margaret L. Merrill, Overcoming CFIUS Jitters: A Practical Guide for Understanding 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (noting 
that the “national security standard” used in CFIUS reviews is “vague”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/9
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information technology, or critical infrastructure.
10
 But the Smithfield 
review signaled a more expansive role for CFIUS by including industries 
outside those commonly associated with national security, such as the 
meat-processing industry, within its purview.
11
 This expansion is well 
within CFIUS’s powers as there are virtually no limits on what it can 
review.
12
 These powers are amplified by the secrecy that shrouds CFIUS 
reviews because most of the information analyzed is either classified 
government intelligence or confidential business information.
13
 Granting 
CFIUS this seemingly plenary power is the answer the United States has 
supplied for the problem of balancing investment with national security. 
Although the creation of a CFIUS-like regime is one potential solution, 
some countries have taken a different tack while others have outright 
ignored the problem altogether. 
This Note will survey several Latin American (“LATAM”) countries 
and the regulatory regimes used to protect their economies to see how they 
compare with CFIUS. This comparison will provide insight into the 
differences between LATAM and American concepts of national security 
and the factors taken into account when deciding whether to allow a 
foreign investment to take place. This Note will show that these 
differences may have played a role in the establishment of nationalization 
policies in the past and that the U.S. government should encourage the 
development of robust regulatory regimes in LATAM to prevent future 
nationalizations. While these regimes may discourage some American 
 
 
 10. Liz Hoffman, $7B Smithfield Sale Gets Antitrust Regs’ OK, CFIUS Still Looms, LAW360 
(July 15, 2013, 7:53 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/457457/7b-smithfield-sale-gets-antitrust-
regs-ok-cfius-still-looms, archived at https://perma.cc/L9EC-5ANM?type=source. See infra Part III 
for examples of CFIUS reviews involving the military, information technology, and critical 
infrastructure. 
 11. See Bill Black, U.S. Senate Hearing on Smithfield Foods Poses Challenge to CFIUS, FORBES 
(July 9, 2013, 11:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/simonmontlake/2013/07/09/u-s-senate-hearing-
on-smithfield-foods-poses-challenge-to-cifus/, archived at http://perma.cc/432M-9VH6 (stating that 
making “protection of the food supply a national security issue would significantly expand the scope 
of CFIUS.”). 
 12. See Exec. Order No. 13,456 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 13,456(6) (2008) (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. app. § 2170) (outlining the CFIUS review process). The only limitations imposed on CFIUS’s 
review powers are those provided by the President as the Committee operates under the authority of 
the executive branch. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE 
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2013) (“[T]he discretion CFIUS uses to review 
and to investigate foreign investment cases reflects policy guidance from the President.”). For its 
power to block mergers or acquisitions, CFIUS can only “act if there was ‘credible evidence’ that a 
transaction would ‘impair’ national security and that the impact could not be lessened by any other 
legal provision.” David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 
93 (2010) (quoting the Exon-Florio Amendment, 50 U.S.C. app § 2170(d)(4)(A) (2006)). 
 13. Merrill, supra note 9, at 33–34 n.211. 
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investment in the region, they will also discourage investment from 
competing economic powers such as China. By reducing the ability of 
other countries to establish hegemonic relationships with LATAM 
countries, these regimes will increase the independence and security of the 
Western Hemisphere as a whole. 
Part II of this Note provides a background on CFIUS. Part III involves 
an analysis of CFIUS decisions to determine the factors that are 
considered important to national security. Part IV provides a necessary 
background on the importance of natural resources in LATAM to show the 
effect of these resources on the region’s economies. Part V provides a 
survey of the investment regulations of select LATAM countries, 
specifically Mexico, Chile, and Brazil.
14
 Part VI is an examination of 
nationalization as a national security policy and its prevalence in LATAM. 
The Note then argues in Part VII that the United States should support the 
establishment of CFIUS-like legal regimes in LATAM, despite the 
potential limiting effect on American investment, as these regimes reduce 
the chance of nationalization and encourage security in the Western 
Hemisphere as a whole. 
II. CFIUS BACKGROUND 
President Gerald Ford created CFIUS through an Executive Order
15
 in 
1975 amid concerns other nations were investing in the United States for 
political reasons.
16
 In its original form, CFIUS was solely a reviewing 
committee since it did not have any power other than to consolidate and 
 
 
 14. Mexico, Chile, and Brazil were chosen due to the size of their economies, the importance of 
their natural resource sectors, and the availability of information regarding their investment regimes. 
See The World Factbook: Mexico, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
geos/mx.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2015); The World Factbook: Chile, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ci.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2015); The World Factbook: 
Brazil, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/br.html (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2015). Additionally, they are representative of different geographic areas, as Mexico includes 
a large swath of Central America while Chile and Brazil both have diverse climates that are similar to 
those found in most South American countries. Id. 
 15. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3A C.F.R. app. 159 (1975) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2170). 
 16. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 1. A majority of these investing nations were members of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Id. These investments came in just after 
the end of an oil embargo by OPEC against the United States. Zaring, supra note 12, at 92. Two Latin 
American countries, Venezuela and Ecuador, were members of OPEC during this time. Member 
Countries, OPEC, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/CXD8-TPXF.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/9
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review information regarding a contested transaction.
17
 The power to 
block a transaction was not bestowed upon CFIUS until the passage of the 
Exon-Florio
18
 Amendment in 1988.
19
 The original purpose of this 
Amendment was to prevent the export of technology in a bid to ensure the 
United States had a competitive advantage in the world economy.
20
 The 
next step after granting CFIUS some teeth was to further define its role. 
Through the Byrd Amendment,
21
 CFIUS was required to review 
transactions where “the acquirer is controlled by or acting on behalf of a 
foreign government; and . . . the acquisition results in control of a person 
engaged in interstate commerce . . . that could affect the national security 
of the United States.”22 This Amendment turned CFIUS into an effective 
tool for the government to achieve national economic security in corporate 
transactions.
23
 CFIUS remained untouched until 2007 when Congress 
passed the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA).
24
 This 
Act “required CFIUS to conduct more investigations, guided those 
investigations by providing more detailed congressional instruction about 
what to look for, authorized the Committee to impose sanctions on foreign 
companies that failed to comply with CFIUS requirements, and mandated 
that additional, extensive, and detailed reports be provided to Congress.”25 
Like the Byrd Amendment, FINSA’s expansion of CFIUS’s power 
amplified its ability to be used as a weapon when it comes to national 
security. Since 2007, CFIUS’s powers have not been substantially 
adjusted. 
 
 
 17. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3A C.F.R. app. 159 (1975) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2170). 
 18. This Amendment was named for the two Congressmen who proposed it, James Exon (D-NE) 
and James Florio (D-NJ). Zaring, supra note 12, at 92–93. 
 19. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (current version at 
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012)). The Amendment granted the President the power “to block acquisitions 
of particular concern or to impose conditions on the acquisition before approving the sale.” Zaring, 
supra note 12, at 93. It was passed on August 23, 1988. Marc Greidinger, The Exon-Florio 
Amendment: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 6 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 111 (1990–1991). 
 20. Greidinger, supra note 19, at 112. 
 21. This Amendment was named after the Senator who proposed it, Robert Byrd (D-WV). See 
Matthew R. Byrne, Protecting National Security and Promoting Foreign Investment: Maintaining the 
Exon-Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 868 (2006). 
 22. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 6. The Byrd Amendment required CFIUS to report to Congress 
on its findings. Zaring, supra note 12, at 94 n.60. It also expanded upon the factors that should be 
considered when deciding on a transaction. Id. at 94 n.59. 
 23. Despite having the power and the means to prevent foreign investment, no transactions were 
blocked between 1992 and 1997. Id. at 95. 
 24. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012)). 
 25. Zaring, supra note 12, at 95–96. 
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CFIUS’s authorizing legislation provides guidelines for the scope of its 
powers, although this scope might be different in practice due to the 
discretion CFIUS has in ordering a review.
26
 The Executive Order 
authorizing CFIUS’s creation did not include any reference as to what it 
could review except limiting its reach to transactions involving foreign 
investment.
27
 This scope became more focused with the passage of the 
Exon-Florio Amendment, which listed eleven factors for CFIUS to 
consider.
28
 These factors include whether the business is related to national 
defense or the military, either through the business’ industry or its 
downstream production; the technology the business may have; the effect 
of the transaction on critical infrastructure; the role of a foreign 
government in the transaction; and how the transaction may affect future 
energy and resource demand by the United States.
29
 As is clarified in the 
text of the eleventh factor, these are merely guidelines,
30
 and any 
“covered” transaction31 may be reviewed at CFIUS’s discretion.32 The 
most recent amendment to the original Executive Order, made in 2008, 
continued the tradition of vagueness regarding CFIUS’s scope as its 
predecessor.
33
 Thus, the only definitive statement that can be made about 
CFIUS’s scope is that it is limited to transactions involving foreign entities 
attempting to gain control over American assets. 
While the authorizing legislation is vague as to CFIUS’s scope, it 
provides more guidance on CFIUS’s membership. CFIUS is composed of 
members from different federal executive departments. The original 
Executive Order authorizing the creation of CFIUS stated the members 
were to be representatives from the Departments of Treasury, State, 
Defense, and Commerce, as well as the Assistant to the President for 
 
 
 26. Jennifer Cooke, Note, Finding the Right Balance for Sovereign Wealth Fund Regulation: 
Open Investment vs. National Security, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 728, 749–50 (“The statute provides 
a list of factors for the President to take into consideration ‘as appropriate’ when evaluating covered 
transactions, but ultimately, the statute leaves such a determination to the discretion of the President 
and CFIUS on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 27. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3A C.F.R. app. 159 (1975) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2170). 
 28. See § 2170(f) (listing eleven factors to be considered when evaluating a transaction’s effect 
on national security). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. A “covered transaction” is defined as “any merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed 
or pending after August 23, 1988, by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign control 
of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” Id. § 2170(a)(3). 
 32. Id. § 2170(b). 
 33. Exec. Order No. 13,456, 3 C.F.R. 13,456 (2008) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2170). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/9
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Economic Affairs and the Executive Director of the Council on 
International Economic Policy.
34
 Later, the Exon-Florio Amendment 
added the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget to CFIUS.
35
 Within five years, another amendment added the 
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Assistant 
to the President for National Security Affairs.
36
 CFIUS membership went 
untouched for almost fifteen years when, in 2008, another amendment 
added the United States Trade Representative, the Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers, and the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.
37
 The Executive Order 
authorizing CFIUS established the Secretary of the Treasury Department 
as the chair and permits him or her to include other departments “as he [or 
she] deems appropriate.”38 Although CFIUS’s core membership revolves 
around departments or personnel that focus mainly on national security or 
the economy, CFIUS has a flexible structure that permits other interested 
parties to be included in the review process, depending on the subject 
matter of the transaction.
39
 This flexibility, when combined with its almost 
plenary review power, makes CFIUS a potentially effective weapon to 
prevent many of the significant economic threats to the United States from 
transpiring. 
The review process itself is also structured to make CFIUS an 
adaptable and effective weapon. Transactions can be voluntarily submitted 
to CFIUS by providing written notice or CFIUS can unilaterally initiate 
the review.
40
 Once CFIUS receives notice, it has thirty days to make a 
determination of the transaction’s effect on American national security.41 
The review ends once all CFIUS members decide that the transaction does 
not threaten national security.
42
 But if any members decide there is a 
threat, CFIUS can take an extra forty-five days to investigate.
43
 Once a 
review is complete, CFIUS must notify Congress and send a report with its 
 
 
 34. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3A C.F.R. app. 159 (1975) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2170). 
 35. Exec. Order No. 12,661, § 3-201(1)(F), 3A C.F.R. app. 618 (1988) (amending Exec. Order 
No. 11,858, 3A C.F.R. app. 159 (1975), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170). 
 36. Exec. Order No. 12,860, 3 C.F.R. 629 (1993) (amending Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3A C.F.R. 
app. 159 (1975), codified as amended 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170). 
 37. Exec. Order No. 13,456, 3 C.F.R. 13,456 (2008). 
 38. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3A C.F.R. app. 159 (1975). 
 39. Id. 
 40. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170. 
 41. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 15. 
 42. Id. at 16. 
 43. Id. 
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recommendation to the President.
44
 Even if CFIUS does not recommend 
blocking the transaction, the President has “almost unlimited authority to 
take ‘such action for such time as the President considers appropriate to 
suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair the 
national security of the United States.’”45 This procedure serves to harness 
the plenary review power granted to the President to ensure any 
questionable transaction does not affect national security. 
CFIUS’s structure and scope make it a robust defensive mechanism for 
the U.S. government to review and block any corporate transactions that 
might threaten national economic security. But the use of such wide-
ranging power is entirely discretionary.
46
 An examination of CFIUS’s past 
decisions is necessary to understand how this power is exercised and to 
determine which factors CFIUS considers most important to national 
security. 
III. PAST CFIUS DECISIONS 
CFIUS’s exercise of power is impossible to observe directly as its 
deliberations are kept confidential due to the sensitivity of the business 
information and intelligence involved.
47
 But there are several ways to lift 
this veil of secrecy. This Part attempts to do so by providing an analysis of 
reports of CFIUS-reviewed transactions and court challenges to CFIUS 
decisions to highlight the types of transactions it considers threat to 
national security. 
A. Reports of CFIUS-Reviewed Transactions 
The main source of information on CFIUS’s decisions is publicly 
approved or denied transactions.
48
 The first transaction blocked by CFIUS 
was Chinese military aircraft manufacturer China National Aero-
Technology Import and Export Corporation’s (“CATIC”)49 acquisition of 
 
 
 44. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170. 
 45. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 17 (quoting the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012)). 
 46. Cooke, supra note 26, at 749–50 (“The statute provides a list of factors for the President to 
take into consideration ‘as appropriate’ when evaluating covered transactions, but ultimately, the 
statute leaves such a determination to the discretion of the President and CFIUS on a case-by-case 
basis.”). 
 47. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170. 
 48. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 9–12. 
 49. The China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) is a Chinese 
military aircraft company based in Beijing. About CATIC, CHINA NAT’L AERO-TECH. IMP. & EXP. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/9
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American aircraft parts manufacturer MAMCO Manufacturing Inc. 
(“MAMCO”)50 in 1990.51 MAMCO submitted a voluntary notification for 
CFIUS to review the transaction.
52
 Before CFIUS’s review was complete, 
CATIC acquired MAMCO by “purchas[ing] all [of] MAMCO's voting 
securities.”53 CFIUS’s final report to President George H.W. Bush was 
that the transaction posed threats to national security, namely that “CATIC 
had ties to the Chinese military; . . . the transaction would give CATIC 
‘unique access’ to U.S. aerospace companies; and . . . some of the 
technology produced by MAMCO was export-controlled.”54 President 
Bush then ordered CATIC to divest its interest in MAMCO, voiding the 
transaction.
55
 As the first transaction blocked by CFIUS, the CATIC-
MAMCO acquisition provided a signal to foreign investors that the United 
States now had a new weapon in its national security arsenal and was 
willing to use it, even if that meant souring foreign relations.
56
 The 
blocking of the transaction also demonstrated that CFIUS decisions could 
be based on a variety of national security concerns, most of which revolve 
around the acquiring entity’s relation to foreign governments or militaries, 
potential to commit industrial or military espionage, or the transfer of 
technologies deemed essential to national security.
57
 
After the CATIC-MAMCO acquisition, the most well-known blocked 
transaction is the Huawei acquisition of 3Leaf. Huawei,
58
 a Chinese 
telecommunications company, acquired 3Leaf,
59
 an American firm that 
 
 
CORP., http://www.catic.cn/indexPortal/home/index.do?cmd=goToChannel&cid=750&language=US 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BRY3-ADHJ. 
 50. MAMCO Manufacturing Inc. was “a Seattle based manufacturer of parts for commercial 
aircraft.” Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International Investment 
Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 96 (1989). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Maira Goes de Moraes Gavioli, National Security or Xenophobia: The Impact of the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act (“FINSA”) in [sic] Foreign Investment in the U.S., 2 WM. 
MITCHELL L. RAZA J. 1, 13 (2011). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Alvarez, supra note 50, at 98 (“President Bush had been advised by some officials not to 
nullify the [CATIC-MAMCO] transaction to avoid angering China.”). 
 57. De Moraes Gavioli, supra note 52, at 13. 
 58. Huawei is an information and communications technology provider based in Shenzhen, 
China. Corporate Information, HUAWEI U.S., http://www.huawei.com/us/about-huawei/corporate-
info/index.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/NE79-XDCV. 
 59. 3Leaf Systems, Inc. was a “server virtualization solution[]” provider based in Santa Clara, 
California. 3Leaf Systems, Inc.: Private Company Information, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=24308298 (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9CYM-4R2Q. Server virtualization permits businesses to 
increase the computing power of their physical servers without increasing their amount by creating 
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made computer servers, in 2010 for two million dollars.
60
 This transaction 
was later blocked due to Huawei’s association with the Chinese 
government.
61
 Although this blocking generated a lot of controversy at the 
time, in retrospect it was well-founded as Huawei was accused of spying 
for China two years later.
62
 Like the CATIC-MAMCO acquisition, the 
Huawei-3Leaf acquisition demonstrates that CFIUS bases its decision to 
permit or block a transaction based on a foreign entity’s relation with a 
foreign government as well as the potential for that entity to gather 
intelligence as a result of the transaction. 
An additional example of a CFIUS-reviewed transaction within the 
information technology industry is the NTT Communications-Verio 
acquisition. In 2000, CFIUS reviewed the acquisition of Verio,
63
 an 
American web hosting company, by NTT Communications,
64
 the 
telecommunications subsidiary of a Japanese holding company where the 
Japanese government was a majority shareholder.
65
 Initially, there were 
concerns the Japanese government could use its position to “access . . . 
information regarding wiretaps that were being conducted on email and 
other Web-based traffic.”66 But CFIUS approved the acquisition on the 
condition that “the Japanese government would have no role in Verio, 
Inc.'s day-to-day operations or involvement in wiretapping Verio's 
network.”67 Similar to the reasoning behind the Huawei-3Leaf blockage, 
 
 
virtual servers that act and can perform similar to physical servers. See How to Set up a Virtualization 
Server, PCWORLD (July 20, 2010, 6:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/201408/how_to_ 
build_a_virtualization_server.html. 
 60. Huawei Drops a Controversial US Takeover Bid for 3Leaf, BBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2011, 1:12 
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12520640, archived at http://perma.cc/3GUV-Q4GC. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Huawei Denies Spying Allegations by Former CIA Chief, BBC NEWS (July 19, 2013, 9:58 
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-23373178, archived at http://perma.cc/9VCV-DRYR. The 
espionage accusations related to Huawei using its position to disclose to the Chinese government 
“intimate and extensive knowledge of the foreign telecommunications systems it is involved with.” Id. 
(quoting former CIA chief Michael Hayden). 
 63. Verio, Inc. is web hosting company based in Orem, Utah. Contact Verio, VERIO, 
http://www.verio.com/contact/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2C7T-6JUM. 
 64. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) Communications Corporation is a 
telecommunications company based out of Tokyo. About Us: Our Company, NTT COMMC’NS, 
http://ntt.com/aboutus_e/our-company/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/NY4B-HZZC. 
 65. See About NTT Stock, NTT GROUP, http://www.ntt.co.jp/ir/shares_e/digest.html (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SEL9-JQ99 (chart showing “Government and Public 
Bodies” own 32.51% of the NTT Group and are therefore the largest shareholders).  
 66. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 9. 
 67. Kathleen A. Lacey et al., International Telecommunications Mergers: U.S. National Security 
Threats Inherent in Foreign Government Ownership of Controlling Interests, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 29, 49–50 (2002). 
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this condition shows CFIUS’s concern for foreign governments using the 
transaction as a means to gain access to sensitive information. 
Besides the defense and information technology industries, CFIUS has 
been active in reviewing transactions within the energy industry. An 
example of a CFIUS-reviewed transaction within the energy industry is 
the acquisition of Nexen,
68
 a Canadian oil firm, by China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd. (CNOOC),
69
 the Chinese state-run oil firm, 
in 2013. Although Nexen is technically a Canadian firm, it owned U.S. 
drilling leases in the Gulf of Mexico.
70
 These leases served as “a primary 
source of U.S. oil.”71 CFIUS approved the transaction only after CNOOC 
agreed to divest itself of Nexen’s assets in the Gulf, thus preventing it 
from gaining control over the leases.
72
 While this transaction was 
successful, CNOOC was not so lucky when it tried to purchase Unocal,
73
 
an American oil and gas company, in 2005.
74
 CNOOC abandoned the 
acquisition after public outcry over the Chinese government’s involvement 
in the transaction and concerns that energy supplies would be diverted 
away from the United States made it clear CFIUS would never grant 
approval.
75
 Understandably, transactions involving the transfer of control 
 
 
 68. Nexen Inc. is an oil and gas company based in Calgary, Canada. About Us: Office Locations, 
NEXEN, http://www.nexencnoocltd.com/en/AboutUs/OfficeLocations.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2015). 
 69. CNOOC is a Hong Kong-based holding company with subsidiaries involved in the 
exploration, production, and sale of oil. CNOOC Ltd.: Profile, WALL ST. J., 
http://quotes.wsj.com/HK/XHKG/883/company-people (last visited Feb. 24, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3YRS-6SCN. CNOOC is owned by the Chinese government. Chester Dawson, Cnooc 
Wins Right to Build LNG Export Plant at Canadian Site, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2013, 8:38 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303460004579194543986768858, archived at 
http://perma.cc/K9KJ-6MR6.  
 70. Tennille Tracy, Cnooc Agrees to Alter U.S. Oil Leases, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2013, 1:25 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323978104578334351323478398, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5Q3V-6R5S. 
 71. Id. The 200 deep-water leases had reserves of “about 205 million barrels of oil, one of the 
largest holdings in the Gulf.” Rebecca Penty & Sara Gay Forden, Cnooc Said to Cede Control of 
Nexen’s U.S. Gulf Assets, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 1, 2013, 7:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2013-03-01/cnooc-said-to-cede-control-of-nexen-s-u-s-gulf-assets, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
CMC3-WGX2. 
 72. Tracy, supra note 70. Although CNOOC gave up control of the leases, it “retain[ed] 
ownership of the contracts and collect[s] profits from the oil production.” Id. 
 73. Unocal Corporation was an oil and gas exploration and production company based in El 
Segundo, California. Unocal Corp., BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, http://www.bloomberg.com/profiles/ 
companies/UCL:US-unocal-corp (last visited Feb. 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/N8NF-
8UKC. 
 74. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 9. 
 75. Anthony Michael Sabino, Transactions that Imperil National Security: A Look at the 
Government’s Power to Say “No”, 77 N.Y. ST. B.J. 20, 21 (2005) (“Opponents of the deal proclaimed 
dire repercussions if an American energy company was in fact sold to an entity clearly controlled by 
the government of a major foreign power and, furthermore, one with its own massive energy needs.”). 
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over U.S. energy production and supply to foreign entities would bring up 
national security concerns.
76
 CFIUS decisions within this industry, as seen 
in the CNOOC transactions, indicate that CFIUS regards energy as an 
essential element of national security and will block most, if not all, 
transfers of control over U.S. energy to foreign entities. 
Although CFIUS will generally prevent the transfer of control over 
American energy-related assets to foreign entities, it did permit one such 
acquisition. In 2012, Chinese auto-parts manufacturer Wanxiang
77
 sought 
to acquire A123 Systems,
78
 an American electric-car battery 
manufacturer.
79
 The national security-based objections to the transaction 
revolved around the transfer of the technology owned by A123, which 
supposedly could be used for military applications.
80
 CFIUS approved the 
transaction after Wanxiang excluded the government business portion of 
A123 from the acquisition.
81
 The saving grace for the Wanxiang-A123 
transaction was likely that, although it involved the sale of control over 
energy assets, these assets were not in the oil and gas industry like those in 
the CNOOC transactions. Instead, the assets involved electric car batteries, 
a nascent technology which had not yet gained traction in the United 
States.
82
 This lack of popularity meant such an acquisition posed little 
 
 
 76. The threat of a loss of control over energy was demonstrated during the 1973 oil embargo, 
which saw a “major transfer of wealth [from the United States] to OPEC members.” Bruce Winfield 
Bean, Attack of the Sovereign Wealth Funds: Defending the Republic from the Threat of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds?, 1 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 65, 88 (2009). This embargo was the catalyst for the creation 
of CFIUS. Id. at 90. 
 77. Wanxiang Group Corporation is an auto-parts manufacturer based in Hangzhou, China. 
Michael Bathon, Wanxiang Wins U.S. Approval to Buy Battery Maker A123, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 
2013, 12:14 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-29/wanxiang-wins-cfius-approval-to-
buy-bankrupt-battery-maker-a123.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PAW7-9K6R. 
 78. A123 Systems Inc. was a battery manufacturer based in Waltham, Massachusetts. A123 
Systems Inc. Profile, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/AONEQ:US/profile (last visited 
Nov 15, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/3V8X-D7EQ. After it was sold to Wanxiang, it changed its 
name to B456 Systems, Inc. Kai Petainen, Battery Company Changes Name from A123 to B456—A 
Fire Extinguisher?, FORBES.COM (Mar. 28, 2013, 7:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kaipetainen/ 
2013/03/28/battery-company-changes-name-from-a123-to-b456-a-fire-extinguisher/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/H34L-UR7G. 
 79. Bathon, supra note 77. 
 80. Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. Clears Wanxiang to Buy A123 Assets, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2013, 
2:14 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323829504578271724184629726, 
archived at http://perma.cc/S3P6-RRNP. These objections, while involving national security concerns, 
were mainly focused on the fact the technologies had been developed as a result of government grants. 
Id. Thus, the transaction was viewed as selling taxpayer-owned property to a foreign entity. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. In 2012, the year of Wanxiang’s acquisition of A123, electric vehicles, including hybrids, 
only made up 3.38% of car sales in the United States. Electric Drive Sales, ELECTRIC DRIVE 
TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.electricdrive.org/index.php?ht=d/sp/i/20952/pid/20952 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4DA6-XP5W. 
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threat to national security. The Wanxiang-A123 transaction demonstrates 
that CFIUS decisions are based not only on the type of threat the 
transaction poses to national security, but also the scale of threat. An 
acquisition in a critical industry such as energy will likely be approved by 
CFIUS if the threat to national security is minor. 
CFIUS has been active in reviewing decisions beyond the energy 
industry. One such transaction is British software company 
Smartmartic’s83 acquisition of Sequoia Voting Systems,84 an American 
voting machine supplier, in 2005.
85
 Although Smartmatic is based in the 
United Kingdom, its management is largely Venezuelan.
86
 This fact 
became quite relevant as relations between the United States and 
Venezuela—under Hugo Chavez at the time—could best be described as 
unfriendly.
87
 Opposition to the transaction rallied under this banner, citing 
concerns the Venezuelan government might assert control over 
Smartmatic and could therefore influence U.S. elections.
88
 The 
Congresswoman who initially raised the issue stated, “the integrity of our 
voting machines is vital to national security.”89 This principle was 
illustrated just five years earlier when issues with voting machines in 
Florida troubled the 2000 presidential election.
90
 The pressure of a CFIUS 
 
 
 83. Smartmatic International Corporation is a London-based technology solution provider 
focused on electronic voting systems. Smartmatic International Corporation: Private Company 
Information, BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/ snapshot. 
asp?privcapId=20882341 (last visited Nov 16, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/3DZS-TQ8C.  
 84. Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc. was a provider of touch-screen voting systems based in 
Denver, Colorado. Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc. Profile, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=2242029 (last visited Mar. 21, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/TA29-P494. 
 85. Tim Golden, U.S. Investigates Voting Machines’ Venezuela Ties, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/washington/29ballot.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
7VV2-GSX9. 
 86. Our Team, SMARTMATIC, http://www.smartmatic.com/about/our-team/ (last visited Mar. 7, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CQW5-9V39. 
 87. See Golden, supra note 85 (“Officials of both Smartmatic and the Venezuelan government 
strongly denied yesterday that President Chávez’s administration, which has been bitterly at odds with 
Washington, has any role in Smartmatic.”). 
 88. Id. Additional concerns over the transaction were that, even if there were no attempts at 
electoral fraud by another country in the United States, the Sequoia purchase would legitimize 
Smartmatic and enable it to commit such fraud in other countries “where safeguards against fraud are 
weaker.” Id. 
 89. Rep. Carolyn Maloney, Smartmatic Announces It Will Sell Sequoia Voting Systems, 
Withdraw from CFIUS Review, CAROLYN B. MALONEY (Dec. 22, 2006), http://maloney.house.gov/ 
media-center/press-releases/smartmatic-announces-it-will-sell-sequoia-voting-systems-withdraw-
cfius-review, archived at http://perma.cc/V7XE-CUF4. 
 90. Abby Goodnough, Voting Machines Giving Florida New Headache, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/13/us/politics/13voting.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
Y6W7-MZ6L. 
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review proved to be too much for Smartmatic as it sold its ownership of 
Sequoia even before CFIUS made its decision.
91
 This move all but 
confirmed the position of the transaction’s opponents.92 Like the Huawei-
3Leaf transaction, the death knell for the Smartmatic-Sequoia transaction 
was the acquirer’s relationship with a foreign government.93 This 
questionable relationship was amplified by the politically sensitive nature 
of the asset being sold, as voting machines play an essential role in 
American democracy.
94
 Although CFIUS did not have the chance to issue 
its recommendation, it is likely the transaction would have been blocked. 
Not only was there potential for the acquiring company to be influenced 
by a foreign government, but any foreign influence over American voting 
machines would naturally pose a threat to national security. 
The most controversial CFIUS-approved transaction was the Dubai 
Ports World
95
 acquisition of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company (“P&O”)96 in 2005,97 just before the Smartmatic-Sequoia 
transaction.
98
 At the time of the transaction, P&O controlled six U.S. 
ports.
99
 These ports formed only a small part of P&O’s business as its 
operations stretched across the world.
100
 Despite the insignificance of the 
ports to P&O’s overall business, both Dubai Ports and P&O agreed it was 
probably significant to the U.S. government and voluntarily submitted the 
transaction for a CFIUS review.
101
 Also weighing towards the need for a 
CFIUS review was the fact Dubai Ports is wholly owned by the United 
 
 
 91. Maloney, supra note 89. 
 92. See id. (“But now it seems the company could not overcome the cloud of doubt surrounding 
this deal—had they been able to, we would not be talking about a sale of Sequoia today.”). 
 93. To be clear, no definitive evidence was presented connecting Smartmatic to the Venezuelan 
government. See id. (“For a few years, questions have surrounded Smartmatic about its ownership and 
its possible ties to the Venezuelan government.”). The deal fell apart merely because of speculation 
there was a connection. See id. 
 94. See id. (“[T]he integrity of [U.S.] voting machines is vital to national security”). 
 95. Dubai Ports World is a marine terminal operator based in Dubai. Company Profile for DP 
World Ltd., BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/DPW:DU/profile (last visited Mar. 7, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9V8R-PL2J. 
 96. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O) was a port operator based in 
London. Company Overview of Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company Limited, 
BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=410998 (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5FJA-SDH3. 
 97. De Moraes Gavioli, supra note 52, at 20. 
 98. See supra notes 84–94 and accompanying text. 
 99. De Moraes Gavioli, supra note 52, at 20.  
 100. Thomas E. Crocker, What Banks Need to Know About the Coming Debate over CFIUS, 
Foreign Direct Investment, and Sovereign Wealth Funds, 125 BANKING L.J. 457, 459 (2008) (“[T]he 
U.S. port assets of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company Limited [were] a minor 
part of a global acquisition of P&O.”). 
 101. De Moraes Gavioli, supra note 52, at 20. 
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Arab Emirates (UAE) government.
102
 Regardless, CFIUS approved the 
transaction, as Dubai Ports would never actually assume control of the 
ports themselves.
103
 This approval proved moot as political outcry over the 
transaction eventually pushed Dubai Ports to divest its interest in the U.S. 
ports.
104
 The controversy over this approval, which made it appear as if 
CFIUS was too soft on national security, spurred Congress to pass the 
FINSA legislation, thus “broadening the interpretation of national 
security.”105 Under FINSA, CFIUS would have blocked the Dubai Ports-
P&O transaction as it threatened national security by ceding control of 
“critical infrastructure”106 to a foreign entity that was controlled by a 
foreign government.
107
 As seen in the previous examples, CFIUS blocks 
transactions involving the transfer of control over assets within a national 
security-sensitive industry, especially when the acquirer is connected to a 
foreign government. 
Although the Dubai Ports-P&O transaction created controversy, 
protests were reserved to persons and entities that had an interest only in 
the national security aspect of the transaction.
108
 But the companies 
involved have a more vested interest in the financial aspect of the 
transaction as CFIUS approval may be the difference between billions of 
dollars and nothing.
109
 As these companies attempt to capture the value 
resulting from a merger or acquisition, they might protest a CFIUS 
decision through judicial challenge, which, in turn, provides more insight 
into CFIUS’s decision-making process.  
 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (“CFIUS did not identify national security issues in this transaction because DPW would 
neither be in charge of the ports themselves nor port security. Rather, it would manage terminal port 
operations without acquiring the ports themselves.”). 
 104. Robert S. LaRussa, Lisa Raisner & Thomas B. Wilner, New Law Heightens Scrutiny of 
Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Companies, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 285, 290 (2007). 
 105. De Moraes Gavioli, supra note 52, at 21 
 106. “Critical infrastructure” is defined as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so 
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets would have a 
debilitating impact on national security.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(6) (2012). Ports would fall under 
this category. LaRussa, Raisner & Wilner, supra note 104, at 291. 
 107. See De Moraes Gavioli, supra note 52, at 25–27 (discussing the FINSA definition of 
“covered transaction”). 
 108. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 109. For instance, CNOOC bid $18 billion in cash to acquire Unocal but dropped this bid once a 
CFIUS review was initiated. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 9. 
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B. Court Challenges 
There has only been one judicial challenge to a CFIUS decision: Ralls 
Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S.
110
 Ralls Corp. 
involved the acquisition of a windmill farm in Oregon by a Chinese 
company.
111
 The Ralls Corporation, a subsidiary of a Chinese company,
112
 
bought a wind farm in north-central Oregon from U.S. Innovative 
Renewable Energy, LLC, an American company.
113
 CFIUS blocked the 
transaction because the farm was located close to a naval installation and 
several turbines were located in restricted airspace.
114
 Proximity to the 
naval base was enough for the transaction to be considered a threat to 
national security and to require divestiture.
115
 While common sense would 
dictate that CFIUS should block the acquisition of any companies 
involved with the U.S. military, the Ralls Corp. case illustrates that even 
proximity to military facilities might pose a threat to national security. 
Thus, CFIUS decisions depend on not only what the target company does, 
but also where it is. 
These examples demonstrate the manner in which CFIUS interprets 
and applies the concept of national security in corporate transactions. 
While they do little to provide a comprehensive definition of “national 
security,” these examples suggest certain industries such as energy and 
critical infrastructure have a close relation to national security. They also 
hint at the complexity of determining a transaction’s relation to national 
security. CFIUS considers factors beyond just the identity of the bidder or 
target companies and the industry in which they operate, such as the 
allegiance of management and location of the target company’s facilities. 
More importantly, these examples show that one of the main threats to 
 
 
 110. See generally Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 
2013). The dearth of judicial challenges to CFIUS decisions may be due to a clause in the authorizing 
statute that prevents such action. § 2170(e) (“The actions . . . and the findings of the President . . . shall 
not be subject to judicial review.”). The Ralls Corp. case was submitted to the court alleging not that 
the decision was wrong, but that the President was acting beyond his powers in blocking the 
transaction. Ralls Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 83–91. 
 111. Ralls Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 75.  
 112. The Ralls Corporation is a Delaware-incorporated subsidiary of SANY Group Co., Ltd. Ralls 
Corporation: Private Company Information, BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/ 
research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=206889484 (last visited Nov 14, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/KT6V-3EDD. SANY Group Co., Ltd. is a Chinese construction machinery 
manufacturer. Corporate Overview, SANY GROUP, http://www.sanygroup.com/group/en-
us/about/group.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6DTH-V6T2. 
 113. Ralls Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 78. 
 114. Id. at 76, 78. 
 115. Id. at 76. 
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U.S. national security is a foreign interest gaining control over these 
industries. But these concerns are not just limited to the United States. 
Many countries in LATAM have similar concerns despite having a 
different economic structure than the United States. 
IV. BACKGROUND ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND LATAM ECONOMICS 
Natural resources
116
 play an important role in the economies of many 
LATAM countries. Both Venezuela and Ecuador are members of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), meaning they 
have “a substantial net export of crude petroleum.”117 Additionally, Brazil 
was invited to join OPEC but declined.
118
 Beyond hydrocarbons, LATAM 
has large reserves of other minerals. Chile alone accounts for “35 per cent 
of global copper production.”119 LATAM as a whole produces 21% of the 
world’s gold, 48% of the world’s nickel, and 45% of the world’s copper.120 
 
 
 116. This Note adopts the OECD’s broad definition of “natural resources,” which is “natural 
assets (raw materials) occurring in nature that can be used for economic production or consumption.” 
Glossary of Statistical Terms: Natural Resources, OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/ 
detail.asp?ID=1740 (last updated Dec. 2, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/G8V5-24KC. This 
definition includes mining, fishing, forestry, fossil fuel, and agricultural products. See id. 
 117. Member Countries, OPEC, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/A8E2-WZR4. 
 118. Brazil Declines Opec Invitation, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2008, 1:14 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/americas/7599362.stm, archived at http://perma.cc/XKE9-5Z6L. 
 119. P.A.J. LUSTY, BRITISH GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SOUTH AMERICA MINERAL PRODUCTION 
1997–2006 vi, (2008). 
 120. STEVEN T. ANDERSON ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE MINERAL INDUSTRIES IN 
LATIN AMERICA AND CANADA 25–26, Table 4 (2013). LATAM as a whole also produces 21% of the 
world supply of bauxite, 15% of the world supply of iron ore, 13% of the world supply of lead, 14% of 
the world supply of silver, 23% of the world supply of tin, 21% of the world supply of zinc, 12% of 
the world supply of salt, 12% of the world supply of gypsum, 19% of the world supply of phosphate, 
and 16% of the world supply of coal. Id. 
 Bolivia provides an interesting illustration of the wealth of resources found in LATAM. Bolivia is 
the poorest country in South America with a GDP per capita of $5,000. The World Factbook, CIA, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (last visited Jan 
15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/JN3W-8UA7. But the country was once famed for its large 
silver deposits, particularly those found in a mountain located near the city of Potosí, colloquially 
addressed as “Cerro Rico,” or “Rich Mountain.” City of Potosí, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CENTRE, 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/420 (last visited Mar. 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PFK3-YNKR. 
In fact, the phrase “rich as Potosí,” which entered the common vernacular by way of Miguel de 
Cervantes Saavedra’s classic Don Quixote, was once used to express vast wealth. RICHARD L. KAGAN, 
URBAN IMAGES OF THE HISPANIC WORLD, 1493–1793 101 (2000). Bolivia might once again become a 
center of wealth as it contains the world’s largest deposit of lithium, an essential component of 
batteries and thus an increasingly important resource as the world shifts away from hydrocarbon fuels 
towards electric-powered renewables. See Lawrence Wright, Lithium Dreams, THE NEW YORKER, 
Mar. 22, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/03/22/lithium-dreams, archived at 
http://perma.cc/QMB6-N89F (describing the potential of Bolivia’s lithium deposits to rejuvenate its 
economy). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1664 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1647 
 
 
 
 
But minerals are not the only natural resource dominated by LATAM. 
Peru’s extensive coastline enables it to be “the world's largest producer 
and exporter of fishmeal and fish oil by volume.”121 The expansive 
grasslands of Argentina and southern Brazil support large amounts of 
crops and livestock. Brazil is poised to become the world’s top producer of 
soybeans
122
 and Argentina is already “the world's largest exporter of 
soybean meal and oil.”123 Brazil and Argentina are also second and sixth, 
respectively, in terms of beef production.
124
 Other agricultural products 
prevalent in the region include coffee,
125
 sugar cane,
126
 and fruit.
127
 As 
indicated by these examples, natural resources play an integral role in 
LATAM economies, providing a major source of revenue through 
domestic consumption as well as exports. 
But the importance of natural resources is not just limited to LATAM; 
natural resources account for twenty percent of global trade.
128
 Many 
economies are dependent on the importation of natural resources to satiate 
domestic demand.
129
 Natural resources are the raw material from which 
 
 
 121. P.R. Venkat & Chun Han Wong, Chinese Firm Is Lured to Peru’s Fishing Industry, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323384 
604578327943718904284, archived at http://perma.cc/PQ44-TBAJ. Peru’s coastline and fishing 
industry was at the center of a border dispute with Chile from the late 1800s until 2014, when it was 
settled by an International Court of Justice decision. Peru–Chile Border Defined by UN Court at the 
Hague, BBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2014, 8:46 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25911867, 
archived at http://perma.cc/VJD2-UB3B. As a result of this decision, Peru gained fishing rights worth 
over $200 million annually. Id. 
 122. Whitney McFerron, Brazil Soybean Planting Progresses as Argentina Needs More Rain, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 5, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-05/brazil-soybean-
planting-progresses-as-argentina-needs-more-rain.html, archived at http://perma.cc/RFD2-H2LQ. 
 123. Soybean and Oil Crops: Trade, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/soybeans-oil-crops/trade.aspx#.UocUhPlwqi8 (last updated Oct. 
10, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/FNN3-XCT7. 
 124. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY: WORLD 
MARKETS AND TRADE 9 (2013). 
 125. Brazil is the world’s top producer of coffee while Colombia is third. Justin Doom, World’s 
Top 10 Coffee-Producing Countries in 2010–2011, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2011, 11:29 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-19/world-s-top-10-coffee-producing-countries-in-2010-
2011-table-.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4URY-NSME. 
 126. Brazil is the world’s largest producer of sugar cane. Blair Euteneuer, World’s Top 10 Sugar-
Producing Countries in 2010–2011, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2011, 2:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/2011-10-06/world-s-top-10-sugar-producing-countries-in-2010-2011-table-.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/T6TG-U297. 
 127. Brazil is the world’s largest producer of oranges and Mexico is the world’s largest producer 
of lemons. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., CITRUS: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE 3, 7 
(2013). 
 128. Michele Ruta & Anthony J. Venables, International Trade in Natural Resources: Practice 
and Policy 1 (World Trade Org., Working Paper No. ERSD-2012-07, 2012), available at 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/oxf/oxcrwp/084.html. 
 129. In 2008, the United States imported over $583 billion worth of natural resources. WORLD 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/9
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many consumer goods are produced and also help feed billions of people 
across the world. Certain resources are dwindling as the global population 
increases and the flush of money going to developing nations has 
increased their demand for these resources.
130
 Increased demand leads to 
increased competition.
131
 But this competition is not just between 
companies; it is also between nations. The more resources a nation 
controls, the more readily it can satisfy domestic demand.
132
 A nation 
gains control through territorial claims
133
 or by acquiring an interest in a 
business that controls a natural resource.
134
 As the days of warfare over 
natural resources are hopefully over,
135
 the latter method is how countries 
now gain control over natural resources. 
The capital-intensive nature of the natural resource sector
136
 facilitates 
the acquisition of companies operating in this sector by foreign interests. 
To extract a resource such as oil, billions of dollars must be spent on 
exploration, production, distribution, and management.
137
 Even then there 
 
 
TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2010: TRADE IN NATURAL RESOURCES 59 (2010). During the 
same year, Japanese imports were $350 billion, Chinese imports were $330 billion, and European 
Union imports were $766 billion. Id. 
 130. KLAUS SCHWAB, WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2012–
2013, at 1, 49 (2012). See also OECD, NATURAL RESOURCES AND PRO-POOR GROWTH: THE 
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 72 (2008) (“Many emerging economies are major importers of natural 
resources.”). 
 131. The assumption inherent in this statement is that the supply of goods is being outpaced by 
demand. Only a portion of the demand can be satisfied when demand is more than supply, leading to a 
shortage and thus competition among consumers. MICHAEL PARKIN, ECONOMICS 74 (8th ed. 2008). 
This competition is reflected in an increase in price of the good. Id. Normally, the market would 
respond to this increase in price by increasing output, but natural resources face a variety of 
constraints, such as depletion. Id. at 468. Depletion is common with nonrenewable natural resources, 
which are resources like coal and oil that “nature does not replenish.” Id. at 403. As the supply of 
nonrenewable natural resources decreases due to increased consumption of these resources, more 
consumer demand leads to increased competition.  
 132. See Ruta & Venables, supra note 128, at 12 (“Resource exporting countries can, potentially, 
control both the quantity of the resource exported and the overall quantity produced.”). Resource-rich 
nations can satiate domestic demand through imposing export taxes. Id. The effect of these taxes “is to 
reduce the domestic price of the resource, since producers adjust supply until they are indifferent 
between exporting and selling in the domestic market.” Id.  
 133. See Anna Spain, Beyond Adjudication: Resolving International Resource Disputes in an Era 
of Climate Change, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 352–53 (2011) (discussing the relation between 
resource scarcity and international conflict over control of these resources). 
 134. Tracy, supra note 70 (discussing CNOOC’s relinquishing of Nexen’s Gulf Coast leases as it 
would effectively give China control over American oil wells). 
 135. See supra note 133. 
 136. Thomas Gunton, Natural Resources and Regional Development: An Assessment of 
Dependency and Comparative Advantage Paradigms, in 79(1) ECON. GEOGRAPHY 67, 69 (2003). 
 137. In 2009 alone, thirty major energy companies spent a combined $166 billion on “exploration, 
development, property acquisition, and production.” U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PERFORMANCE 
PROFILES OF MAJOR ENERGY PRODUCERS 2009 vii (2011). 
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is no assurance these costs will be recovered as initial estimates might be 
wrong.
138
 For nations without the ability to obtain this capital 
domestically, foreign direct investment might be necessary.
139
 The OECD 
defines foreign direct investment as “cross-border investment by a resident 
entity in one economy with the objective of obtaining a lasting interest in 
an enterprise resident in another economy.”140 Essentially, this investment 
is in illiquid assets such as property as opposed to the liquid assets of 
portfolio investment.
141
 This need for foreign investment creates an 
opportunity for an investing country to exert influence over the target 
country.
142
 With more control over the target country’s natural resources, 
the investing country can exert more control over the target country’s 
economy, simultaneously increasing its political influence. This 
situation—where the government serves merely as a puppet for foreign 
interests—creates a national security risk and is what CFIUS was created 
to avoid.  
 
 
 138. The saga of Eike Batista best illustrates the risk inherent in the natural resource sector. 
Batista is a Brazilian entrepreneur who owned oil, logistics, and mining companies. Eike Batista-
Owned OSX Files for Bankruptcy, BBC NEWS (Nov. 11, 2013, 4:50 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/business-24905669, archived at http://perma.cc/G44L-7BB7. At one point, he was one of the 
richest men in the world, valued at $30 billion. Id. His empire fell apart when his oil company only 
produced “a quarter of its initial forecast, resulting [in] a huge decline in its share price.” Id. The oil 
company went bankrupt and Batista’s fortune fell to less than a billion dollars. Anderson Antunes, 
Brazil’s Eike Batista, Onetime the World’s 7th Richest, Is No Longer a Billionaire, FORBES (Sept. 2, 
2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andersonantunes/2013/09/02/brazils-eike-batista-
onetime-the-worlds-7th-richest-is-no-longer-a-billionaire/, archived at http://perma.cc/A74B-R55T. 
His precipitous fall from grace was accelerated further when he was put on trial for insider trading. 
Brazilian Billionaire on Trial for Insider Trading, BBC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2014, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30109481, archived at http://perma.cc/LSK9-HH8T. 
 139. Cf. Jessica Ball, Note, A Step in the Wrong Direction: Increasing Restrictions on Foreign 
Rural Land Acquisition in Brazil, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1743, 1744 (2012) (describing the need for 
foreign direct investment when there is “a lack of domestic capital from private and governmental 
sources” in the context of agriculture in developing countries). 
 140. OECD, Foreign Direct Investment, OECD FACTBOOK 2013: ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND SOCIAL STATISTICS 86 (2013), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-
factbook-2013_factbook-2013-en. 
 141. UNITED NATIONS, ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AMERICA & THE CARRIBBEAN, FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 2012 24 n.1 (2013) (“Portfolio 
investments are transactions in marketable securities—public or private—such as stock and bonds, as 
well as money market instruments.”). 
 142. An example of a country using foreign investment as a political tool is a situation that 
transpired in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis. According to former Treasury Secretary Hank 
Paulson, Russia attempted to conspire with the Chinese government to flood the market with Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac securities, which would have made a government bailout of those firms more 
costly and “maximize[d] the turmoil on Wall Street.” Robert Peston, Russia ‘Planned Wall Street Bear 
Raid’, BBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014, 4:26 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26609548, archived 
at http://perma.cc/6QMV-7VCA . 
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Given the prevalence of natural resources in LATAM and its 
underdeveloped capital markets, foreign investment plays an important 
role in supplying capital to extract these resources.
143
 In turn, this 
investment raises questions of national security as foreign countries might 
try to exert influence over the LATAM countries in which they invest. 
These LATAM countries have to rely on regulations and other policies to 
prevent the loss of their sovereignty yet still encourage investment. 
Several countries in the region have responded to this issue by establishing 
regulatory regimes for foreign investment similar to CFIUS. 
V. LATAM CFIUS COUNTERPARTS 
Mexico, Chile, and Brazil have instituted laws to restrict foreign direct 
investment. These laws reduce the possibility of foreign influence over 
their government. This Part is a survey of these laws and how they 
compare to the legal regime that empowers CFIUS. 
A. Mexico: Comisión Nacional de Inversiones Extranjeras 
The Mexican government implemented a three-level system under the 
1993 Ley de Inversión Extranjera (“LIEX”) to prevent the acquisition of 
nationally important industries by foreigners.
144
 The first level creates a 
state monopoly in industries such as energy, telecommunications, 
infrastructure, and the coinage of money.
145
 The second tier limits 
investment solely to Mexican nationals in the industries of land 
transportation, energy and communications distributions, and development 
banking.
146
 The final tier, where foreign investment is allowed in minute 
amounts which are highly regulated, includes production cooperatives, air 
transport, banking, weapons, news media, freshwater fishing, 
administration of ports, sea navigation, and combustibles for 
 
 
 143. UNITED NATIONS, ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AMERICA & THE CARRIBBEAN, supra note 
141, at 38. LATAM financial depth, which is “total regional debt and equity outstanding divided by 
regional GDP,” is 148%, which is less than a third of U.S. financial depth and the second-lowest of 
any region in the world. CHARLES ROXBURGH, SUSAN LUND & JOHN PIOTROWSKI, MCKINSEY 
GLOBAL INST., MAPPING GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 2011: UPDATED RESEARCH 4 Exhibit E2 (2011).  
 144. Ley de Inversión Extranjera [LIEX] [Foreign Investment Law], as amended, Diario Oficial 
de la Federación [DO], 16 de Febrero de 1995, translated in TAX LAWS OF THE WORLD (Foreign Tax 
Law Publishers 1994). 
 145. Id. art. 5. 
 146. Id. art. 6. 
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transportation.
147
 This three-level system permits the government to 
control the penetration of foreign investment into certain industries. 
LIEX is administered by the Comisión Nacional de Inversiones 
Extranjeras (CNIE).
148
 The CNIE is similar to CFIUS as it “may reject 
applications to acquire Mexican companies for national security reasons” 
and “has 45 working days to make a decision.”149 Title 6 of LIEX provides 
the structure for the CNIE.
150
 The CNIE is composed of the Minister of the 
Economy, who acts as president; Deputy Minister for Competitiveness and 
Regulation, who acts as the executive secretary; the General Director of 
Foreign Investment, who acts as technical secretary; the Deputy Ministers 
of each Ministry, who act as representatives; and the General Director of 
Legal Affairs, who provides legal advice on the CNIE’s decisions.151 This 
composition is similar to CFIUS in that the CNIE draws from a variety of 
subject-matter experts to examine an acquisition from several different 
viewpoints to ensure it will not adversely affect Mexican national security. 
While the purpose and form of the CNIE are similar to CFIUS, the 
CNIE differs in one major respect: it can legislate.
152
 Even though CFIUS 
has the power to review and recommend or reject any covered transaction, 
it cannot go beyond this power to make recommendations applicable 
beyond a specific transaction.
153
 In contrast, the CNIE can perform the 
same functions as CFIUS as well as issue general resolutions and policy 
guidelines for foreign investment.
154
 This attribute arguably makes CNIE 
decisions more predictable than CFIUS decisions. This predictability 
serves to encourage more investment but potentially at the cost of 
decreasing national security. Foreign investors can attempt to increase the 
probability of success of their acquisition by structuring a transaction in 
 
 
 147. Id. art. 7. 
 148. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2013 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT: MEXICO, 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204693.htm (2013) (“The National Foreign Investment 
Commission under the Secretariat of Economy determines whether investments in restricted sectors 
may go forward.”). 
 149. Id. art. 28. 
 150. LIEX, as amended, tit. 6, DO, 16 de Febrero de 1995, translated in TAX LAWS OF THE 
WORLD (Foreign Tax Law Publishers 1994). 
 151. CNIE: Estructura Orgánica, SECRETARÍA DE ECONOMÍA, http://www.economia.gob.mx/ 
comunidad-negocios/competitividad-normatividad/inversion-extranjera-directa/comision-nacional-de-
inversiones-extranjeras (last visited Mar. 22, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4BDN-B7QB. 
 152. CNIE: Atribuciones, SECRETARÍA DE ECONOMÍA, http://www.2006-2012.economia.gob. 
mx/comunidad-negocios/inversion-extranjera-directa/comision-nacional-de-inversiones-extranjeras/ 
atribuciones (last visited Mar. 22, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/26V8-YH5B. 
 153. See supra notes 39–44 (describing the CFIUS review process as being limited to reviewing 
individual transactions). 
 154. CNIE: Atribuciones, supra note 152. 
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line with previously issued CNIE policies. Foreign investors might also 
structure a transaction that threatens national security in a manner to 
obfuscate this threat, permitting a transaction which otherwise would have 
been blocked to go through. The predictability of CNIE’s decisions shifts 
the balance towards emphasizing investment and away from national 
security. The stringent restrictions of LIEX act as a counterbalance to even 
the scale as they completely prevent foreign investment in some of the 
most important Mexican natural resources, especially those related to 
energy.
155
 
The energy industry is important to the Mexican economy, and as such 
it sits in the first tier of LIEX, where foreign investment is completely 
prohibited since the government has a monopoly over the industry.
156
 The 
petroleum industry alone “accounted for about 32 % of total government 
revenues in 2013.”157 As stated above, the Mexican government’s tight 
hold over this critical industry might offset CNIE’s predictability to create 
equilibrium between foreign investment and national security. But this 
balance may be threatened by the opening of the energy industry to foreign 
investment.
158
 The purpose of this loosening of control was to help 
revitalize the Mexican economy by injecting capital into the flagging 
energy industry,
159
 which has seen a decrease in oil production “from 3.4 
million barrels per day in 2004 to the . . . rate of 2.5 million barrels per day 
[in 2013].”160 While the benefit of such reforms may be to enable Mexico 
to grow faster,
161
 this growth likely will be at the expense of national 
 
 
 155. LIEX, as amended, art. 5, DO, 16 de Febrero de 1995, translated in TAX LAWS OF THE 
WORLD (Foreign Tax Law Publishers 1994). 
 156. Id.  
 157. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Mexico: Analysis, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips 
=MX (last updated Apr. 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/J6TS-RCHQ. 
 158. Mexican Congress Approves Controversial Oil and Gas Bill, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2013, 
7:39 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-25350993, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
5JPT-84VD. Although the reforms passed, they were not without controversy. Id. There was strong 
opposition against opening up the energy sector, culminating in physical altercations between 
politicians and disruptions of proceedings by protestors. Id. One politician even stripped down to his 
underwear while giving a speech in the legislative chambers as a form of protest. Id. 
 159. Dolia Estevez, Mexico Reverses History and Allows Private Capital into Lucrative Oil 
Industry, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2013/12/11/ 
mexico-reverses-history-and-allows-private-capital-into-lucrative-oil-industry/, archived at http://perma. 
cc/9ZJ2-CF6H. 
 160. Mexican Congress Approves Energy Bill, BBC NEWS, supra note 158. 
 161. The Finance Minister of Mexico, Luis Videgaray, claimed that the opening of the energy 
sector as well as other reforms would contribute to Mexico having a five percent growth rate in 2016. 
Dave Graham, Mexican Economy Should Be Growing 5 Percent by 2016—Videgaray, REUTERS (Jan. 
9, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/09/mexico-economy-videgaray-idUSL2N 
0KJ19820140109, archived at http://perma.cc/Q87T-LAZM. 
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security as control over the energy industry shifts away from the Mexican 
government to foreign interests.
162
 
B. Chile: Comite de Inversiones Extranjeras 
In contrast to the strict restrictions imposed by Mexico’s LIEX, Chile’s 
Ley 600 permits investment in almost all industries.
163
 Ley 600 only 
restricts foreign investment in industries such as “nuclear energy, defense, 
maritime transportation, real estate, and mining.”164 Most of these 
restrictions are justified on the basis of national security. For instance, 
mining concessions are permitted except in certain cases, such as if the 
concession was to occur in an area important to national security like 
border or coastal areas.
165
 Yet most of these exceptions can be disregarded 
through presidential authorization.
166
 This flexible structure weighs toward 
encouraging foreign investment over protecting national security concerns 
as it creates a system of exceptions to the exceptions, demonstrating that 
foreign investment may have priority over national security. 
Ley 600 is administered by the Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras 
(CIE).
167
 The CIE encourages as well as reviews foreign investment into 
Chile.
168
 The CIE is composed of “the Ministers of Economy, . . . Finance, 
Foreign Relations and Planning as well as the president of the Central 
Bank. Other ministers responsible for specific economic sectors are also 
 
 
 162. The intense interest of foreign investors in the Mexican energy sector was quite apparent as 
an Italian company signed a deal less than one month after the reforms were passed, barely giving 
enough time for the ink to dry. Jude Webber, Enel and Mexico Sign Energy Deal, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 14, 
2014, 1:23 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/65f84118-7caa-11e3-9179-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qdQ 
MelYI, archived at http://perma.cc/A68G-Y9V4. 
 163. Law No. 600, Septiembre 3, 1993, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O], translated in LATIN AMERICAN 
LAWS REGULATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT, SB04 ALI-ABA 323, 334 (1996). 
 164. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2011 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT: CHILE, http://www.state. 
gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/157257.htm (2011). 
 165. Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, Legal Framework of Foreign Investment in Chile, 18 LAW & BUS. 
REV. AM. 203, 207 (2012). Although the law does not specific which areas are considered important to 
national security, another law prohibits foreign investment in real estate “in the area comprised 10 
kilometres along the borders and 5 kilometres along the coast” for national security reasons. OECD, 
ACCESSION OF CHILE TO THE OECD: REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICIES (2009), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/chile/49846624.pdf. Assumedly, the same national security concerns 
apply for mining concessions. 
 166. See Lazo, supra note 165, at 207 (quoting World Trade Organization Secretariat, Trade 
Policy Review: Chile para. 24, WT/TPR/S/220 (Sept. 2, 2009)) (“However, both national and foreign 
firms can participate in these sectors in certain circumstances, subject to presidential authorization.”). 
 167. MINISTERIO DE ECONOMÍA, FOMENTO Y TURISMO, COMITÉ DE INVERSIONES EXTRANJERAS, 
CHILE: LAND OF OPPORTUNITIES (2d ed. 2012), available at http://www.ciechile.gob.cl/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/Chile-land-of-opportunities12.pdf. 
 168. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 164. 
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invited to participate in meetings whenever deemed necessary.”169 The 
composition of the permanent members of the CIE emphasizes the 
importance of the economic aspect of foreign investment as the Minister 
of Foreign Relations is the only minister whose position does not directly 
involve the economy. This composition is a stark contrast to that of 
CFIUS, whose permanent membership includes the Department of 
Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and 
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism.
170
 Also, while CFIUS’s decisions can be justified on a 
variety of factors and are not judicially reviewable,
171
 the CIE’s “authority 
to reject a foreign investment is severely limited by the Chilean 
Constitution”172 and “can be appealed if an investment is rejected.”173 By 
establishing these limits and permitting review, the Chilean government is 
essentially shifting power from the CIE to foreign investors. Giving more 
power to foreign investors indicates that the Chilean government wants to 
furnish them with every opportunity to invest in Chile, thus underscoring 
the importance of foreign investment. The CIE, while serving a similar 
function to CFIUS, is structured in a manner such that it is apparent the 
Chilean government favors foreign investment over national security. 
C. Brazil: Conselho de Defesa Nacional 
Unlike Mexico and Chile, Brazil has a more complex regulatory 
regime regarding foreign investment. Instead of being condensed into a 
single comprehensive law, the regime is splintered across Brazil’s Federal 
Constitution and various pieces of legislation.
174
 When cobbled together, 
these laws amount to a prohibition on investment in the nuclear, 
healthcare, postal services, and aerospace industries.
175
 These laws also 
limit foreign investment in financial institutions, land located in rural areas 
or near national borders, domestic aviation, and telecommunications 
 
 
 169. MINISTERIO DE ECONOMÍA, FOMENTO Y TURISMO, supra note 167. 
 170. For more information on the composition of CFIUS, see discussion supra Part II. 
 171. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (2012) (“The actions . . . and the findings of the President . . . 
shall not be subject to judicial review.”). 
 172. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 164. 
 173. Id. 
 174. For more on the specific laws and Constitutional articles involving the restrictions and 
limitations of foreign investment in Brazil, see Quinn Smith & Olavo Franco Bernardes, Mechanisms 
of Control on the Circulation of Foreign Capital, Products and People in Brazil, 44 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 219 (2013). 
 175. TERRENCE F. MACLAREN, 2 ECKSTROM’S LICENSING: JOINT VENTURES § 9:66 (2013). 
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companies.
176
 Additionally, there are limitations on investment in the 
mining industry.
177
 Most of these limitations permit foreign investment 
upon government authorization or if certain domestic ownership 
requirements are met.
178
 This foreign investment regulatory regime sits in 
the middle of the spectrum between the strict Mexican LIEX on one side 
and the lenient Chilean Ley 600 on the other. By completely prohibiting 
foreign investment in certain industries, the Brazilian regulatory regime is 
more akin to LIEX. Yet as the regime permits foreign investment upon 
government authorization in other industries, it is more like the case-by-
case system established by Ley 600. By striking this balance, Brazil 
appears to have established an equilibrium between national security and 
foreign investment. 
The administration of the Brazilian foreign investment regulatory 
regime is scattered across a variety of government agencies
179
 and the 
Brazilian National Congress grants most authorization for foreign 
investment in limited industries.
180
 Although this structure is unsuitable for 
direct comparison to CFIUS, the regime maintains a slight parallel to 
CFIUS in regards to the Conselho de Defesa Nacional (CDN).
181
 The 
CDN is a government council with the purpose of advising the President 
of Brazil about national sovereignty and defense.
182
 This broad purpose 
includes the specific task of creating criteria and conditions for the use of 
areas indispensable to the national security of Brazil, especially border 
areas and those related to the preservation and exploitation of natural 
resources.
183
 As a result, foreign investment in border areas requires the 
approval of the CDN.
184
 Even though the CDN’s authorizing law also 
 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS, LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS IN BRAZIL 33 
(2012). 
 178. Foreign investment in financial institutions and land located in rural areas or near national 
borders requires authorization by the government while such investment in the domestic aviation or 
telecommunications industry requires a clear majority of capital voting stock to be held by Brazilian 
citizens. MACLAREN, supra note 175. Foreign investment in mining requires permission to be granted 
by the government. MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 177. 
 179. For a list of some of the regulating government agencies, see Smith & Bernardes, supra note 
174, at 254. 
 180. MACLAREN, supra note 175. 
 181. The CDN is also referred to as the Conselho de Segurança Nacional (CSN), although this 
term is antiquated. Smith & Bernardes, supra note 174, at 243 n.129. The CSN was the original name 
of the council, but its name was changed and structure reformed upon the adoption of 1988 Brazilian 
Constitution. Id. 
 182. Lei No. 8.183, art. 1, de 11 de Abril de 1991, DIÁRO OFICIAL DA UNÃIO [D.O.U.] de 
12.4.1991, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L8183.htm. 
 183. Id. 
 184. MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 177. 
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provides it with the right to regulate Brazil’s natural resources, subsequent 
laws appear to have given this power to other administrative agencies.
185
 
Regardless, the CDN parallels CFIUS as it regulates foreign investment to 
ensure it does not conflict with national security, albeit in a much more 
limited capacity than CFIUS. 
The CDN is composed of members of the executive branch of the 
government as well as ministers from various departments. The permanent 
members of the CDN are the President, who serves as Chair; the Vice 
President; the Senate President; the President of the Chamber of Deputies; 
the Minister of Justice; the Minister of the Navy; Minister of the Army; 
Minister of Foreign Affairs; Minister of the Air Force; and the Minister of 
Economy and Finance.
186
 The President may appoint other members to 
assist with the matter under consideration.
187
 In contrast to the Chilean 
CIE, where the subject-matter expertise of the members revolves around 
the economy,
188
 the CDN’s permanent members are mainly involved in 
political or military matters, with the exception of the Minister of 
Economy and Finance.
189
 This composition hints that the CDN might be 
more interested in the effect of a foreign investment on national security 
than the economy. Thus, the CDN seems to approach the problem of 
balancing national security with foreign investment differently than 
CFIUS, emphasizing national security instead of attempting to find 
equilibrium between the two factors. 
D. CFIUS and Its LATAM Counterparts 
CFIUS and its LATAM counterparts, CNIE, CIE, and CDN, are similar 
as all of these regimes attempt to solve the paradox of encouraging foreign 
investment while also promoting national security. But these regimes 
differ in that CFIUS tries to create equilibrium between foreign investment 
and national security, whereas its LATAM counterparts seemingly favor 
one goal over another. CNIE and CIE favor encouraging foreign 
investment at the expense of national security while the CDN takes the 
 
 
 185. For example, Lei No. 9.478 of 1997 created the National Oil Agency, which is “responsible 
for the regulation of the local oil and natural gas industry, as well as its derivatives and related 
products.” Smith & Bernardes, supra note 174, at 234 n.81 (citing Lei No. 9.478, ch. IV, de 8 de Junho 
de 1997, DIÁRO OFICIAL DA UNÃIO [D.O.U.] de 07.08.1997, available at http://www.planalto. 
gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9478.htm). 
 186. Lei No. 8.183, art. 2, de 11 de Abril de 1991, DIÁRO OFICIAL DA UNÃIO [D.O.U.] de 
12.4.1991, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L8183.htm. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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opposite approach, ensuring national security at the expense of foreign 
investment. The difference between CFIUS and its LATAM counterparts 
might be due to the options available to address this paradox. While 
CFIUS is the main weapon for ensuring national security when it comes to 
foreign investment in the United States, LATAM countries have two 
means to protect their national security. The first, as already discussed, is a 
legal regime similar in form and function to CFIUS. The second and more 
controversial option is nationalization.  
VI. NATIONALIZATION AS A NATIONAL SECURITY TOOL IN LATAM 
Nationalization is defined as “[t]he act of bringing an industry under 
governmental control or ownership.”190 It may be performed for a variety 
of reasons, including national security.
191
 For example, Argentina’s 
President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner justified nationalizing the 
Spanish-run oil firm YPF in 2012 as “it was a matter of Argentina's 
national security, because the country . . . had to start importing fuel.”192 
Similar to a CFIUS-like legal regime, nationalization assures control of a 
country and its economy stays within the hands of its government, thus 
promoting national security. But there is a major difference between these 
methods. Whereas a CFIUS-like legal regime evaluates the effect of 
foreign investment before it takes place, nationalization occurs after this 
investment has already been made. This ex post analysis of a foreign 
investment creates difficulties not encountered with an ex ante analysis, 
making nationalization less efficient than a CFIUS-like legal regime. 
An ex post analysis of a foreign investment’s effect on national 
security is less efficient than a CFIUS-like regime for three main reasons. 
First, assuming there is compensation for such nationalization, there might 
 
 
 190. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1129 (9th ed. 2009). 
 191. Other reasons for nationalization include controlling the income of a nationalized industry, 
reaping a political benefit, promoting a certain political ideology, or limiting or prohibiting the 
investment of private capital. Richard J. Hunter, Jr., Property Risks in International Business, 15 
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 23, 31 (2006). 
 192. Corey Flintoff, Ignoring Critics, Argentina to Nationalize Oil Firm, NPR (Apr. 19, 2012, 
5:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/19/150959215/ignoring-critics-argentina-to-nationalize-oil-
firm, archived at http://perma.cc/ZB63-HTXM. But this nationalization occurred at the same time 
Kirchner’s approval rating was in the midst of a precipitous drop to 34%, almost half of what it was 
the year before. Kirchner’s Popularity Is in Freefall amid New Mass Protests, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Nov. 21, 2012, 7:49 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/kirchners-popularity-is-in-freefall-2012-
11, archived at http://perma.cc/556W-852C. Additionally, it occurred just as Argentina’s growth rate 
dropped from 9% to 2.2%. Id. Given the coincidence of these events, commentators have speculated 
there may have been more nefarious reasons for the nationalization. One columnist even hypothesized 
that the purpose was actually to provide the government with much-needed money. Flintoff, supra. 
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be negotiating over the amount. In terms of international law on the issue, 
UN Resolution 1803 states that compensation should be “appropriate,”193 
although this term is ambiguous.
194
 Furthermore, the Resolution itself is 
not binding.
195
 The United States typically asserts the Hull formula in 
nationalization cases, which requires that compensation be “prompt, 
adequate and effective.”196 Yet this formula is only marginally less 
ambiguous than that of Resolution 1803.
197
 Nationalization will likely 
result in extensive litigation due to this lack of a concrete methodology to 
evaluate compensation, especially when the procedural issues of suing a 
sovereign are considered.
198
 Thus, nationalization is less efficient than an 
ex ante national security review as it will likely be more costly in terms of 
time and money. 
The second and more important reason why nationalization is less 
efficient than a CFIUS-like regime is that such an action might harm the 
country’s reputation in regards to foreign investment. There would likely 
be capital flight as investors try to protect themselves.
199
 In the long term, 
there would be a decrease in foreign investment as investors might 
perceive the risk of nationalization as too great and may decide to not 
invest in the country at all.
200
 Nationalization deters foreign investment 
 
 
 193. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No.17, U.N. Doc. A/5217, at 15 
(Dec. 14, 1962). The relevant portion of the text states, “In such cases [of nationalization] the owner 
shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such 
measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law.” Id. 
 194. See id. (stating that “appropriate” is determined by both local and international law without 
providing further guidance). 
 195. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1113, 1117 (1999) (“United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and other nonbinding 
statements and resolutions by multilateral bodies are often viewed as evidence of [customary 
international law.]”). 
 196. Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of 
Customary International Law, 14 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 327, 358 (1994) 
 197. See supra note 191. 
 198. For a discussion of the difficulties involving suing a sovereign for expropriation, see Ronald 
Mok, Comment, Expropriation Claims in United States Courts: The Act of State Doctrine, the 
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. A Road Map for the 
Expropriated Victim, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 199 (1996). For a discussion of the difficulties of suing a 
sovereign in LATAM specifically, see Claudio Grossman, Suing the Sovereign from the Latin 
American Perspective, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 653 (2003). 
 199. See, e.g., Natalie Huls et al., International Legal Updates, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 38, 38 
(“Further pressure on the currency comes from capital flight as rich Venezuelans try to take money out 
of the country because of fears that President Chávez will nationalize more private companies.”); 
Joseph J. Norton, Doing Business Under the FTAA: Reflections of a U.S. Business Lawyer, 6 NAFTA: 
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 421, 424 (2000) (“The ensuing nationalization of the Mexican banking system 
added further erosion to public confidence, leading to increased capital flight.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Judith Richards Hope & Edward N. Griffin, The New Iraq: Revising Iraq’s 
Commercial Law Is a Necessity for Foreign Direct Investment and the Reconstruction of Iraq’s 
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across all sectors, limiting a country’s growth.201 Meanwhile, a CFIUS-
like legal regime may only deter investment in certain sectors related to 
national security, and even then does not stop attempts by foreign interests 
to invest in these sectors. As nationalization lowers a country’s growth 
compared to what it would be without nationalization,
202
 it is less efficient 
than a CFIUS-like legal regime. 
Finally, the third and most important reason nationalization is less 
efficient than a CFIUS-like legal regime is the potential for international 
incidents stemming from the nationalization. If a foreign government has 
enough of an interest in an investment, it might use force to prevent the 
country from nationalizing it or to reverse the nationalization. One of the 
most infamous examples of this foreign interference is Operation Ajax in 
1953, which saw the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed 
Mossadegh by American and British clandestine services due to his 
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
203
 This operation set 
the scene for U.S. clandestine activities over the next few decades, which 
included the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz for 
threatening to nationalize land belonging to the United Fruit Company
204
 
as well as the attempted assassination of Cuban dictator Fidel Castro for 
his socialist political stance, which threatened U.S. political and economic 
interests.
205
 In this manner, nationalization might counteract its own 
 
 
Decimated Economy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 875, 890–91 (2004) (describing how 
nationalization and confiscation “frighten and deter investors.”). Economists have stated that calls for 
the nationalization of South Africa’s mines might have similar effects. One economist stated, 
“Demands for the nationalization of South African mines are deterring investment and would make the 
country ‘off limits’ to investors if it was put into effect.” Franz Wild, Mine Nationalization Would Kill 
Investment in South Africa, Chamber Says, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2011, 6:41 AM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-04/mine-nationalization-would-kill-investment-in-south-africa-chamber-
says.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3YL6-ZVTD. 
 201. Less investment will result in lower growth, as investment is “one of the determinants of the 
rate at which production grows.” PARKIN, supra note 131, at 486. See also Eric Allen Grasberger, 
Note, MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines: The Best Solution to Foreign Employer Job Discrimination 
Under FCN Treaty Rights, 16 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 141, 159–60 (1991) (“The United States, 
as well as other nations, encourages foreign investment because it creates jobs, broadens capital 
markets, and contributes to overall productivity and economic growth.”). 
 202. This wedge between a country’s actual GDP and its potential GDP is known as the output 
gap. Anthony Garratt et al., Real-Time Representations of the Output Gap, 90(4) REV. ECON. & STAT. 
792, 792 (2008). 
 203. Saeed Kamali Dehghan & Richard Norton-Taylor, CIA Admits Role in 1953 Iranian Coup, 
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2013, 2:26 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-
admits-role-1953-iranian-coup, archived at http://perma.cc/3ACZ-JPJX. 
 204. David M. Barrett, Sterilizing a Red Infection: Congress, the CIA, and Guatemala, 1954, CIA 
(May 8, 2007, 8:59 AM), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol44no5/html/v44i5a03p.htm (last updated Aug. 03, 2011, 2:53 PM).  
 205. DAVID BELIN, ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, SUMMARY OF FACTS: 
INVESTIGATION OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN PLANS TO ASSASSINATE FOREIGN LEADERS 6 (1975). 
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purpose of ensuring national security as it might make foreign 
governments more likely to intervene. This potential ineffectiveness could 
create problems on an international scale, possibly leading to armed 
conflict or, at the very least, the violation of the nationalizing country’s 
sovereignty. A CFIUS-like legal regime limits the justifications for a 
foreign country to interfere in a country’s politics, making it more efficient 
than nationalization and a more effective tool to ensure national security.  
These three reasons, among others, demonstrate that a CFIUS-like 
legal regime is more preferable to nationalization because it is more 
efficient. A CFIUS-like legal regime does not incur the costs associated 
with litigation, protects national security while encouraging foreign 
investment, and prevents scenarios from occurring where foreign 
governments might intervene to protect their interests. Yet, despite its 
inefficiencies, nationalization is still prevalent within LATAM.
206
 Thus, 
LATAM countries should be encouraged to develop a CFIUS-like regime 
as it will promote efficiency and may also have positive effects on the 
security of the region as a whole. 
VII. SUPPORTING CFIUS-LIKE REGIMES IN LATAM 
It is important that the United States work with LATAM countries to 
encourage the creation of robust CFIUS-like legal regimes since 
nationalization is not only inefficient, but it may harm U.S. investors. 
Investment in LATAM formed 10.8% of the United States’ investments 
into other countries in 2012.
207
 While this number may seem small, it 
amounts to $42 billion, or twenty-four percent of the $175 billion invested 
into LATAM during that year.
208
 There is already a risk that these 
 
 
 206. Nationalization continues to occur in several LATAM countries, namely, Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Argentina. See Veronica Espinosa & Daniel Cancel, Bolivia Following Argentine 
Takeover Deepens Regional Divide, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/2012-05-02/bolivia-following-argentine-takeover-deepens-regional-divide.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7KR8-FBDW (“Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina and Ecuador have taken over energy, 
cement, airline, pension and mining companies in the past five years.”). During his rule, Hugo Chavez 
was known for hosting a weekly talk show where one of his catchphrases was “Nationalize it!” due to 
his on-air nationalization of various companies. Esther Bintliff, Venezuela: Six Challenges for 
Chávez’s Successor, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2013/04/ 
venezuela-six-challenges-for-chavezs-successor/, archived at http://perma.cc/27NA-Q5EP. 
 207. OECD, FDI IN FIGURES: OCTOBER 2013 4 Table 2 (2013). 
 208. UNITED NATIONS, ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AMERICA & THE CARRIBBEAN, supra note 
141, at 21 Table I.1, 37 (2013). The United States was the largest individual country to invest in 
LATAM in 2012. Id. 
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investments may not succeed due to business-related factors.
209
 This risk is 
only amplified by adding in the potential for nationalization.
210
 To 
counteract such a risk, the United States might take action to protect its 
interests.
211
 But these actions only add to an ongoing cycle by breeding 
contempt for the United States among the local population.
212
 The 
population then votes for leaders who have anti-American views, such as 
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Argentina’s Cristina Fernandez de 
Kirchner.
213
 These leaders then use the United States as a scapegoat to 
distract the population from the problems caused by their own 
mismanagement of their countries.
214
 Desperate to find sources of income 
and regain control of the economy, they nationalize corporations or sectors 
of the economy where foreign investment is concentrated to prevent the 
 
 
 209. These risks are usually referred to as nonsystematic risks and include factors such as the 
potential for bad management. Managing Investment Risk, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Investors/ 
SmartInvesting/AdvancedInvesting/ManagingInvestmentRisk/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/VQG3-575R. 
 210. Nationalization is considered a sociopolitical risk, which is a subset of systematic risks. Id. 
 211. For more on actions taken by the United States to protect its interests, see supra notes 203–04 
and accompanying text. 
 212. The best example of this contempt is the book Open Veins of Latin America by Eduardo 
Galeano. In his book, Galeano describes the history of LATAM, specifically emphasizing the 
exploitation of its resources by the Spanish at first, followed by the United States. See generally 
EDUARDO GALEANO, OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE CENTURIES OF THE PILLAGE OF A 
CONTINENT (Cedric Belfrage trans., Monthly Review Press 1997) (1971). This book has become so 
popular in LATAM as an expression of the perceived injustices committed by the United States that 
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, known for his anti-American stance, gave President Barack Obama a copy 
during a regional summit. Chavez’s Gesture Turns Book into Bestseller, CNN (Apr. 19, 2009, 12:50 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/SHOWBIZ/books/04/18/latin.america.chavez.book/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/PUV5-XZDP.  
 213. These leaders, as well as Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Brazil’s Luiz Lula da Silva and his 
successor Dilma Rousseff, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, are known as part 
of the “pink tide,” a term for leftist leaders who have enacted policies aimed at decreasing dependence 
on the United States and building relations with other countries. South America’s Leftward Sweep, 
BBC (Mar. 2, 2005, 4:03 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4311957.stm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/PJ63-M7HN.  
 214. At one point, Hugo Chavez blamed the United States for giving cancer to him and several 
other South American leaders. Daniel Cancel, Chavez Says U.S. May Be Behind Leaders’ Cancer, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 28, 2011, 2:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-28/chavez-u-s-
may-be-behind-s-america-leaders-cancer.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NMC2-KY9M. His 
successor, Nicolas Maduro, was quick to follow this strategy, blaming the United States for everything 
from electoral violence to power outages to economic hardship. Charles Shapiro, In Venezuela, It’s 
Still “Yankee Go Home”, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/08/ 
opinion/la-oe-shapiro-venezuela-diplomacy-20131008, archived at http://perma.cc/ET7C-JR5G. He 
even accused the United States of deliberately causing a recession in Venezuela by “flooding the 
markets with oil.” Venezuela Recession Confirmed as Maduro Attacks US ‘Oil War’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 
31, 2014, 2:14 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30638770, archived at http://perma. 
cc/B2NZ-E6ZQ. 
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outflow of money to other countries.
215
 Without sufficient legal recourse 
available to foreign investors,
216
 the U.S. government will take action to 
protect the interests of its citizens, starting the cycle over again. A CFIUS-
like legal regime breaks this cycle of nationalization and U.S. government 
involvement by limiting investment into areas that are important to 
national security, such as the natural resource sector. Although such a 
limitation would have the effect of preventing some U.S. investors from 
investing in LATAM, it would reduce the risk of nationalization, thus 
encouraging economic stability and the longevity of U.S. investments in 
other sectors. 
Besides benefitting U.S. investors, a CFIUS-like legal regime also 
would likely promote regional security and support the sovereignty of 
individual LATAM countries. Such a regime would prevent other 
countries from gaining control of LATAM natural resources and using this 
control to exert influence over LATAM governments. One country in 
particular that poses such a threat is China. As China’s demand for natural 
resources grows in leaps and bounds,
217
 it will look to LATAM to provide 
these natural resources.
218
 Due to the large size of its population as well as 
its huge cash reserves,
219
 China does not just invest to control a portion of 
a country’s natural resources; it seeks to control everything.220 This 
 
 
 215. For an example of such a situation, see the discussion of Argentina’s nationalization of 
Spanish oil firm YPF, supra note 192 and accompanying text. Coincidentally, the three countries that 
have continued to implement policies involving the nationalization of foreign firms, Venezuela, 
Bolivia, and Argentina, also have some of the highest inflation rates in LATAM. The World Factbook: 
Inflation Rate (Consumer Prices), CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2092.html#ar (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
 216. For more on the complications associated with litigation resulting from nationalization, see 
supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text. 
 217.  See Kevin P. Gallagher, Why Latin America Should Not Squander the China Boom, BBC 
NEWS (Jan. 27, 2015), http://m.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30982544, archived at http://perma. 
cc/7QHR-XHE8 (noting that the growth experienced by Latin America from 2003 to 2013 was mostly 
the result of increased demand for natural resources by China). 
 218. See Barbara Kotschwar, Theodore H. Moran & Julia Muir, Chinese Investment in Latin 
American Resources: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 3 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working 
Paper No. 12-3, 2012), available at http://wwv.iie.com/publications/wp/wp12-3.pdf (“Over half of 
Chinese investment in natural resources is in Latin American countries.”). According to analysts, the 
purpose of a July 2014 visit to Latin America by Chinese President Xi Jinping was “to secure more 
natural resources from Latin American countries to fuel China’s long term economic expansion.” 
China’s President Xi Jinping Signs Venezuela Oil Deal, BBC NEWS (July 21, 2014, 8:44 PM), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-28414623, archived at http://perma.cc/J2Z8-MC88. 
 219. China’s cash reserves were estimated to be $3.8 trillion in 2013. The World Factbook: China, 
CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Mar. 22, 
2015). China’s population was estimated to be 1.3 billion as of 2014. Id. 
 220. See, e.g., Joshua Schneyer & Nicolas Medina Mora Perez, Special Report: How China Took 
Control of an OPEC Country’s Oil, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2013, 7:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
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absolute control over an integral part of a country’s economy leaves that 
country open to influence. Influence of a LATAM country by a foreign 
power would conflict with the Monroe Doctrine, the “long-standing pillar 
of U.S. policy in the [Western] [H]emisphere.”221 The Monroe Doctrine, in 
its modern form, is the policy that “any effort to extend . . . political 
influence into the [Western Hemisphere] would be considered by the 
United States ‘as dangerous to our peace and safety.’”222 Given this policy, 
Chinese influence in LATAM is a security threat to the United States. A 
CFIUS-like regime would neutralize this threat by preventing China, or 
any other country, from gaining control of important areas of a LATAM 
country’s economy and using this control to exert influence over the 
country’s government. Without the threat of outside influence, LATAM 
countries would maintain their sovereignty and the economic security of 
the Western Hemisphere as a whole would be enhanced. 
The United States would promote security within the Western 
Hemisphere and ensure the economic well-being of its own investors by 
encouraging LATAM countries to adopt a CFIUS-like legal regime. Such 
a regime would prevent investment in national security-sensitive 
industries, thus removing the need for nationalization as well as any 
potential for foreign influence. Essentially, a CFIUS-like legal regime 
would leave the fate of a country and its economy up to its government 
and people. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
CFIUS is an efficient weapon in defending the United States’ national 
security. From its flexibility to its wide-ranging membership, CFIUS’s 
structure permits it to evaluate transactions from a variety of perspectives 
to determine any possible threats to national security. But security 
concerns should not be limited just to the United States. Instead, the 
 
 
article/2013/11/26/us-china-ecuador-oil-special-report-idUSBRE9AP0HX20131126 (explaining how 
China gained “near monopoly control” of Ecuador’s oil exports). 
 221. Peter Hakim, Is Washington Losing Latin America?, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 39, 45 (2006). 
 222. Olumide K. Obayemi, Legal Standards Governing Pre-Emptive Strikes and Forcible 
Measures of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under the U.N. Charter and General International Law, 12 
ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 42 n.78 (2006). The original Monroe Doctrine was a warning 
directed specifically at European powers to prevent them from making any further attempts to colonize 
territory in the Western Hemisphere. Id. The Monroe Doctrine was later expanded with the declaration 
of the Roosevelt Corollary, which was “a policy of unilateral military intervention by the U.S. 
Government in the domestic affairs of states throughout [Latin America].” Francis A. Boyle, U.S. 
Relations with Central American Nations: Legal and Political Aspects, 78 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
144 (1984). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/9
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United States should look to its southern neighbors and encourage 
LATAM countries to develop their own CFIUS-like legal regimes. By 
doing so, the inefficiencies of nationalization will be avoided, U.S. 
investments in LATAM will face lower risk, and LATAM countries will 
enhance their sovereignty. Not only would these regimes promote national 
security in their respective countries, together they would make the 
Western Hemisphere as a whole more secure. 
Colin Stapleton
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